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BABETTE E. BABICH

SOKAL’S HERMENEUTIC HOAX:
PHYSICS AND THE NEW INQUISITION

As a so-called post-analytic philosopher of science, 1 if also from the marginalized
sidelines, I have been able to tease analytic philosophers, calling them to account for
their desire to imitate scientists and their habit of numbering their paragraphs and their
passion for the acronym. Much more seriously, the scientists themselves have recently
begun to raise the ante for analytic philosophers in the so-called science wars. In essays
and op-ed pieces, physicists are repaying the philosophers’ compliment – not only by
adopting, as popular science writers have long done, the role of cultural critic, but also
by assuming the mantle of philosophy. Science, once the arbiter of scientific truth,
proposes now to vet the truth about everything else. And analytic philosophy of science
has found itself faced with no less uncritical option than blanket applause.
In May of 1996, Alan Sokal, a New York University physicist, submitted an
inauthentic article to the journal Social Text. 2 Its inauthenticity, in Sokal’s mind,
consisted in his pretending to articulate the political and philosophical implications of
recent physics research relevant to various theorems of cultural criticism
(multiculturalism or pluralism, deconstructive indeterminacy, and the valorization of
feminist or gender-open logical schemes). Next, in Lingua Franca, a journal devoted
to academic gossip and scandal, Sokal published a brief retraction.3 Sokal’s first article
(in ST) was bogus,4 the second (in LF) explained why. For the world of academic
publishing, it seemed scandalous that the editors of ST failed (or pretended to fail) to
notice that the parallels he detailed between the results of recent physics research were
“nonsense.” Sokal, for his own part, regarded his effort as “parodic.”
In other words, and we do need to invoke other words here, it is possible to define
Sokal’s ST article as a parody (as Sokal insists) because the author was lying when he
wrote what he wrote. He did not mean it, as children say. But Sokal’s definition of
parody is idiosyncratically superficial. Like a hoax or the related but just as banal genre
of the practical joke, the ST article required a complementary supplement in order to
be properly decoded. Thus Sokal’s LF text retracted his ST text, deconstructing it as
less than earnestly intended – a coreferentiality reinforcing the plausibility of the
hypothesis that Sokal also enjoyed an “in” assured not only by his own authority as a
physicist, but by the lead ST editor himself where the complicity of the LF editors may
for their part be assumed. The difference between the parody Sokal composed and what
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ordinarily counts as parody or satire is the difference between Jerry Seinfeld and
Jonathan Swift. Yet it is asserted again and again, much like the populace’s response
to their naturalist emperor’s new clothes, that Sokal’s ruse is uproariously funny. 5 Sokal,
we are given to believe, is a great laugh for those who are in on the joke, or more
accurately, those who aspire to be thought of as in on the joke. 6 Accordingly, popular
science writers, physicists and others, but above all practitioners of the philosophy of
science have been united in their convicted assertions of appreciative resonance. The
general response thus continues to be a strikingly uniform affirmation of the amusement
value of the “hoax” as amusing – even worthy of “awe” in the case of Peter Caws. 7 Even
Mara Beller’s critical perspective does not deny but only proposes to deepen the target
and the consequences to be drawn from the joke.8
Parody or prank, classification of Sokal’s game is hardly the issue. The stunt, the
sheer achievement of it (I suppose this is what drew Caws’s good philosophical breath),
is the thing. A number of attacks and counterattacks have been proffered, mostly, as
with Steven W einberg’s vigorous effort, 9 on behalf of the prankster – for who among
philosophers of science would willingly assume the part of the dupe? The only defenses
on offer are those from the side of Social Text’s editors, and none of these take more
than an overly legalistic tack in charging “science fraud.” Science, they tell us, “ought”
to play fair and Sokal, they tell us, right though he is, ought to have known better.
Other, embarrassingly irrelevant, defenses follow the thematics, though occasionally
correcting the schematic flaws, of Stanley Fish’s uninflected and less than tactful
argument in the New York Times. 10 Better defenses, like Dorothy Nellkin’s essay in the
Chronicle of Higher Education, analyze the science wars in terms of desperate scientists
seeking scapegoats to blame for the economic troubles in which they now find
themselves, while Nelkin advises against the long-term efficiency of divisive academic
bickering. 11 D efenses of ST offered from the left likewise, and this is important to
emphasize, assume the accuracy of all charges raised (one ought to have invited “peer”
– i.e., other physicists’ – reviews) and, as accurately summarized in Ellen W illis’s
Village Voice essay, recall the scrambling for credit among extremist groups in the wake
of a terrorist attack.12 Thus most of the reviews concur with Sokal’s fundamental claim:
Eliminate unclarity and all will be clear in (science) love and (science) war. And W illis
herself, decidedly on the left and writing for the defense, decries the fuzziness of “pomo
lingo” and the “hermetic verbiage ... covering up muddled thinking,” W einberg, on the
right and on the attack, is no less confident in his claim that physics prose (he is
thinking of the theory of special relativity) is clearly written, whereas philosophical
expression (he invokes Jacques D errida, other authors on the clarity rampage name
Theodore Adorno, himself a dedicated opponent of jargon – and who will ask what to
make of this? – and who will draw the still-needed connection that remains to be
articulated between Derrida and Adorno, refracted via Husserl’s Origin of Geometry?)
is not.13 If Weinberg is compelled to refrain from citing physics prose per se to make
his point, that is because, as he affirms, physics naturally requires technical terminology
while philosophy requires no such terminology and has no comparable training
prerequisites. 14 The leftist contingent asserts this same imperative , which conveniently
reflects the stylistic mandate of establishment analytic philosophy. Ah, well, sigh the
intellectuals who ought to know better, if only things were said simply and plainly,
clearly and distinctly, we would then have the truth. This is a popular and democratic
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ideal. But we need to ask, as Nietzsche once did, is truth simple? 15 Better go further and
ask, Is anything simple?
The conviction about which the science wars are fought is that there exists a wellestablished, explicitly anti-science and irrationalist movement. This perspective
antedates the Sokal affair, corresponding to a series of inquisitorial books by Paul Gross
and Norman Levitt, beginning with the book Higher Superstition: The Academic Left
and its Quarrels with Science in 1994 16 and it is reflected in the title of the 1995
meeting of the New York Academy of Science, The Flight From Reason. According to
the various scientists, logicians, and philosophers speaking at the New York conference,
the problem is that the grand and noble enterprise of science is under attack from
feminist, deconstructive, and postmodernist critiques. The culprit is the disciplinary
obscurantism indulged in by critics of science who fail to “understand” science: which
failure yields complex and vague academic discourse. Accordingly, and this is the
neatly emotional (not logical) conclusion found, the responsibility for an increasingly
negative public perception of science and thus for the recent decline in federal support
for science research – translating to a “war” on science – lies in the subversive effects
of the cult of irrationalism in the academy or at least in the English departments of
various universities. N ip the obscurantism, bad writing, and thought patterns of
deconstruction and postmodernism in the bud, and social enthusiasm (and government
funding levels) for the supercollider and other high ticket research programs will be up
to speed in no time. No more social constructivist talk: bring back scientific reality.
I do not here propose to review the merits of the claim that only irrational forces
could be behind the decline in federal support levels (the projected budget for the
supercollider was on the order of billions rather than the physics routine measure of
millions of dollars) not only because the arcana of the national economy has managed
to elude comprehension from either conservative or liberal perspectives but also
because, as the level of support for research on the human genome project makes very
clear, that same potential public support seems undiminished, given the right appeal.
Hence I address the myth of a war on science as a rhetorical fancy. For what is worth
emphasizing is that both sides in the so-named science wars claim the side of science.
As Nelkin argues, the Sokal affair should be read in terms of the ideological
program of the pro-science, anti-irrationalism movement. Yet, the anti-science
movement that the anti-irrationalist faction is supposed to oppose lacks a manifest
foundation in popular culture. That is, the charge is not that one or two voices critique
science (these can surely be found) but rather that this critique has popular or mass
support as well as undue public influence in the academy itself. But this is false.
Academics are convicted pro-scientists, one and all. And the public (which includes the
academy), far from being anti-science lionizes science as much as it ever did, agitating
not for less research to solve social problems, such as AIDS or breast and prostate
cancer, but for more and better research. If the public advocates support for alternative
medical research, say, it is because the public believes in empirical efficacy, scientific
tests, and the value of experiment far more than it believes in blindly submitting to
AM A conservatism. In other words, what the public expects of science is that it be
science, that is: that it employ scientific or experimental investigation rather than relying
on paradigmatic authority. The public even turns to science and scientists for spiritual
guidance, regarding Stephen Hawking as a cultural as well as an intellectual hero, like
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Albert Einstein. Both New Age movements and fundamentalist conservatives appeal to
scientific authority in arguing their various positions – even those proposed against
received scientific views. To claim an anti-science attitude lacks a basis in popular
sentiment does not mean that I argue that the scientists’ own anxiety is not genuine.
Plato, inventing the kind of thinking that would make science possible, pointed to
unregulated mythic beliefs, poetry, and particular musical modes as the greatest dangers
to, or enemies of, rational society. In the same tradition, modern science long ago
named the church or religious belief the incarnation of irrationality, and, borrowing the
notion of martyrdom from the church, wrote its own story as a history of persecution.
The conviction of the threat posed by ongoing religious hostility to science persists even
where the scientific sensibility is dominant or unrivaled. (Just think of the pro-Darwinist
perspective fueled in no small part by a knee-jerk response to creationism, a response
happily ignoring the confidence on the part of the creationist not that science is wrong
but rather that creationism is science.)
Such change as there has been in public sentiment toward science ought not be
interpreted as a sign of distrust but the excess of confidence which exactly modern
approbation and enthusiasm yields at the postmodern end of the day as the increasing
disappointment and impatience – still not with the ideal of scientific progress but rather
and only with its slow pace. Rather than an anti-science perspective, this disappointment
results from the public’s overweening trust in science. The value of science was never
the production of pure knowledge; the strong cultural “good” of science (in Charles
Taylor’s economically informed sense of strong) has been all along inseparable from
its technological embodiments or inventions. The rhetoric of scientific and
technological progress has been a rhetoric of war against the foes of humankind: the
war on cancer and poverty, the battle against HIV, the struggle against old age and
death itself. The public that heard these claims subscribed to the implications of the
metaphor, which implies a resolution or, ideally, a victory in a finite matter of time,
accordingly the public happily assumes that the “scientific future” (with its attendant
technological benefits) should have arrived by now.
This is the time of our inevitably postmodern discontent. Thus I have argued that
any changed public perception of science results not from growing distrust but
disappointed confidence. It is not that the public has lost its trust but that the public is
increasingly eager to see science fulfill its promise.
CHAOS AND PARADIGM
For most commentators, the scandal is that Sokal’s ST article was accepted for
publication. Yet the conviction (which is equally modern and postmodern) that
scientific rationality represents the supreme intellectual perspective played a vastly more
pernicious role in this case. Not anti-science sentiment on the part of the ST editors but
exactly pro-science prejudice worked to invite a scientist to offer a “hermeneutic”
analysis in the first place. And this pro-science prejudice persists, after the fact, in the
happy fantasy that all the trouble could have been avoided had real (“natural,”
mathematically sophisticated, not literary scholars and not “social”) scientists been
invited to referee Sokal’s essay.
The problem is twofold: it is a problem of translation between conceptual schemes,
as Donald Davidson or as Alasdair MacIntyre might say, or as the late Thomas Kuhn
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might (but would not) have said, of translation across incommensurable paradigms. For
Sokal’s difficulties began with his consummate inability (an inability typical of natural
scientists) to attempt to comprehend the theoretical project of different social scientists’
and cultural critics’ reflections on the social and political conditions and implications
of science, together with a flat-footed theoretical grasp of linguistic functions not to
begin to speak of the meaning of hermeneutics. As some humanists are weak in
mathematics and science, perhaps it is only fair that some physicists be deficient in the
discursive complexities of rhetoric and thought. But what is to be said of and for those
humanists on the postmodern side, who – in their enthusiasm for the literary value of
the sheerest notion of information science, chaos theory, and indeterminacy (that most
delicious of free-play terms) – have been so thoroughly seduced by those metaphors that
researchers and theorists have, for their own part, appropriated to express scientific and
mathematical relations? Attracted by the literary resonances of these metaphors,
postmodernists have gone on to “detect” significances irrelevant to their use within the
confines of science. Yet, pace N. Katherine Hayles and a mixed array of grad students,
chaos theory per se neither uses nor entails reference to Hesiod’s invocation of the
primordial generativity of chaos 17 nor does it invite parallels with Joycean chassis much
less the inventions of Thomas Pynchon. The belief in an openness to radical questions
within such disciplines as physics and information science, explicitly asserted by JeanFrançois Lyotard and characterizing a “new” philosophy of science in the mind of Don
Ihde and others, depends upon a naïve optimism betraying once again an ordinal and
ordinarily modernist – an exactly pro-science – sensibility. The position of science as
arbiter of truth and value from its inception and throughout modern culture – a status,
as more than one critic has noted, akin to that of religion in premodern societies –
remains utterly unchallenged and all-too-modern a constant in postmodern thought.18
HERMENEUTICS OF DECEPTION AND RHETORICS OF SUSPICION
This supreme value of science ought to be kept in mind for the sake of an hermeneutic
reading of the text Sokal offered to perpetrate his hoax. Sokal’s ST essay proposed to
offer the reader “A Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” W hat was
claimed in this essay, if read on its own terms and how, again on its own terms, ought
the reader to have read this text? These are perfectly fine hermeneutic preliminaries to
a reading of any text, but in the case of Sokal’s averred hoax, it must be underscored
that any reading is necessarily a re-reading in the way that most texts are not usually reread but simply read again and again (one returns to the text, like the Bible or
Aristotle’s Ethics, one does not re-read it so much as one reads it again, where rereading has the tone of the peremptory finality with which a disputed decision is re-read
or a questionable exam is re-read). And to complicate the task of re-reading, the
academic reader reflexively eschews a text retracted and stigmatized as a hoax by its
author. That is the part in us that strains to see both duck and rabbit, that conscientiously
reminds us that the two horizontal lines of the Muller-Lyer illusion are “really” equal
in length. The intellectual’s desire for truth is not unrelated to the schoolchild’s fear of
being tricked.
But, just to read his text, Sokal’s stated intention or programme as expressed in his
ST essay was exactly not a claimed argument and exactly not the affirmation of
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anything like a finished assertion. Thus in the introduction to his ST article, Sokal
cautions that his remarks are “of necessity tentative and preliminary.” Thereby Sokal
claims to offer no more than an experimental reflection, a venture, an exactly essayistic
musing. He goes further as he builds his Trojan horse for the editors of Social Text:
“I do not pretend to answer all the questions that I raise. My aim is, rather, to draw the
attention of readers to these important developments in physical science and to sketch
as best as I can their philosophical and political implications. I have endeavored here
to keep mathematics to a bare minimum...” 19
The interpretive problem for an appropriate hermeneutic of this text is not then at
issue, given Sokal’s prefatory disclaimers. Armchair physics, just like armchair
metaphysics, must be given a great deal of antinomic leeway. At issue, since Sokal does
not claim that his text is conclusive but offers only “tentative and preliminary”
speculation, is not the physicist’s accuracy per se of what he reviews as his own
articulation of “the philosophical and political implications” of certain “developments
in physical science.” Moreoever, Sokal offered to give not an account of those
developments (as he cannot do in any case as he promises not to employ the very
symbolic language that would be needed to do so, that is mathematics, the language of
physical science) but an explicit interpretation offered perforce on the level of the
dilletant, for Sokal’s own formation is physics, not philosophy (not even analytic style
philosophy), not political science or cultural criticism. Thus the “philosophical and
political implications” he proposes are not those of an expert witness, where in recent
recuperations of the history of the physical sciences, such expertise has come to be
named not for its authoritative bravado but for the restraint, however calculated, of
modesty.
Since Sokal does not propose to relate an expert scientific account of such
“developments in physical science” but only to offer an interpretation of the same and
employing disciplinary terms which are not his own, the text in question can only
represent what philosophers since Plato quite technically name opinion. Since we are
talking not about the “real world” of physical facts much less the “truth” as such but
merely what Sokal professes to believe, it is essential that what is at stake is only the
meta-textual – and withal non-hermeneutic – issue of whether Sokal meant (as he has
since told us that he did not mean) what he said in his original essay, disclaimer and all.
For apart from qualifiers routine enough in a provisional or speculative or experimental
text, Sokal’s only clear assertion, no matter whether earnestly intended or not, concerns
his effort “to keep mathematics to a bare minimum.” Here his claim is accurate enough
for the subsequent text cites a single equation, G ij = 8 GT ij. All things considered then, in
his preface, Sokal does no more than give himself a warrant for a scientific extern’s
superficiality, renouncing the responsibility of his own specialist’s rigor, and even duly
warning the reader in advance against evaluative skepticism.
And yet if Sokal’s ST text begins with such tentative disclaimers, his LF text takes
an altogether different tone. Here, maliciously indignant, he announces the success of
his ST hoax, claiming his right to serve as judge, jury, and executioner of whole
disciplines other than his own. Yet nothing could be more obvious than that Sokal fails
to understand his own sentences – he seems to regard his disclaimers as the equivalent
of protocol statements in co-authored science texts, fatuously pro forma and adjunct to
the report of the text as such – nor does he seem to comprehend the point of reflective
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critique. In essence, Sokal has no sense of the complex nature and range of the kind of
things one can do with words. For texts proposed as speculative and critical, drawing
the implications assessed in the author’s view as “philosophical and political” are
offered for the similar judgment of the reader’s assessment of the same. Such nonassertoric texts do not report fact but invite further reflection; as readings of possibility,
they are submitted to question. Such texts are under no compulsion to follow the logic
of a physicist, particularly one who does not mean what he says. That is, although
Sokal’s text is presented under the aegis of a physicist’s authority (this applies to both
ST and LF texts), his ST text does not argue on the basis of authority because it does not
argue. Speculative, interpretive texts exceed authorized limits as exactly alternate
readings. W hile meaningful discourse need not (although it may well) observe ordinary
patterns of logic, it is a capital if also a paradoxical and inevitably obscure point that
philosophical speculation does not always do so. And it is salutary to add that reflection
on the fundamental value of logical constructions cannot do so. It is for this reason from
Nietzsche to Davidson (never mind Duhem and Quine and scholars of mathematical and
formal systems can add other names beyond Gödel and Turing) that a critique of logic
and truth cannot be conducted on the ground of logic or truth. It is for this reason that
Nietzsche wrote in “tissues” (in aphorisms and patterned discussions, ranging
contradictory points in productive tension): “the problem of science,” as Nietzsche put
it, “cannot be recognized in the context of science.” 20 This together with Nietzsche’s
penchant for inconsistency and explicit self-contradiction, is usually taken to mean all
manner of things – not one of them good with respect to Nietzsche’s scientific
qualifications – but, in the current context, Nietzsche’s claim is reasonable enough. All
it entails is that the problem of science is ineluctably philosophical not scientific. W e
need to hear from philosophers on the problem of science – not from physicists. And
when I say this I am very aware that this claim flies in the face of an old conviction of
the very young discipline that is the philosophy of science (a discipline, notably, that did
not exist as such in Nietzsche’s day). This is the conviction that to philosophize on
science one ought to be a scientist oneself (this is an ideal prerequisite as, however
much they may aspire to be regarded on the same level, philosophers of science
typically are not scientists). Yet I have argued elsewhere that Nietzsche’s point is not
without substance and that to the extent that the scientist Ernst Mach philosophised
about Knowledge and Error, as indeed he did, to that same extent, he too, like Ludwik
Fleck, was a philosopher. Patrick Heelan’s fine lattice of languages and discourse
communities illustrates something of the way one wears such different hats, not
simultaneously, and not merely cumulatively – that is: what is phenomenological about
it, to borrow Bob Crease’s language, is the aletheic dimension – to use the only word,
regrettably Heideggerian, we can have for the intuitively real (phenomenological) but
counter-intuitive aspect of any revelation of truth as a occluding focus or emphasis that
is always and also concealing or distraction.
W hile in LF Sokal challenges the editors of ST for failing to check the accuracy of
his claims about the “new” physics’ research standards, the editors of LF clearly granted
him the same leeway, clearly unchallenged, with respect to the “new” physics as with
his use of the coordinate and not scientific but patently philosophic terms subjective (by
which he may mean relative, if we adopt the interpretive generosity that Sokal attacks)
and objective (by which he means something vague yet commanding enthusiasm). W hen
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Sokal asserts that there is an objective world, he apparently means to speak of a world
real and independent of the knower and of the knower’s capacity and way of knowing.
But there is a difference of a whole philosophical kind between the claim that we cannot
know the world (real, true, and objective) except on the terms of our capacity to know
the (real, true, objective) world and the claim that there is no world. The difference has
to do with the transformation of understanding involved in speaking of the real world,
the true world, following upon consideration of what it means to speak of knowledge
and truth. This last is an issue demanding an epistemological sophistication rarely
characteristic of scientists.
W ithout question, Sokal is an academic “mole” of precisely the kind necessary to
an utterly fantastic or imaginary “war” between science and the supposed demons of
postmodernism or feminism (which last is an odd place to find enemies as most
“feminist” treatments of science and the philosophy of science are largely about
enfranchisement – that is, getting more women in on the practice and thus in on the
discourse of science – and far less about critique) or “the left” (thus Sokal’s political
sympathies with past leftist traditions are often mentioned to ensure his role as such a
mole or else as vouching for his “moral” honesty). Yet assuming the mole’s function is
the only possible war-making tactic, just as mockery is the only weapon at the disposal
of analytic philosophy contra continental approaches to philosophy (and as I practice
the same from the other side). This is not because continental approaches are otherwise
unapproachable, it is because, as in the case of most cold-wars, the battle has already
been won and winning and losing sides have both been decided in advance. Given the
institutional dominance of both science and its acolyte, analytic philosophy, any kind
of “reasoned” debate would have to be conducted on the ground of (real: hard or true)
science and this just because it is essentially and inevitably irrational to question the
value of rationality. For this same self-referential reason, the task of critical reflection
on science, on rationality and logic, is not at all the first or proper task of cultural and
social criticism, thus it is not on evidence in the sort of work that generally appears in
ST or LF. Much less can the task be undertaken on the basis of sociological or
anthropological studies of science, inasmuch as sociology and anthropology are and
very much wish to be – see Bruno Latour’s sorrowful recantation in his recent book,
Pandora’s Hope 21 – part and parcel of the scientific enterprise. No one, as Nietzsche
repeats the old proverb, can jump over his own shadow. A reflective inquiry into the
nature of science, reason, or truth requires the resources not of literary or cultural
critique, nor indeed of the social context of science, but only the resources of critical
philosophy, if such a critique is indeed possible in an exclusively science-approbative
climate such as our own. It is essential to add that just such a critique is presupposed by
(although this has come to mean: foreclosed in) the very enlightenment ideal of science
as such.
The point of this paradoxical coincidence is that those philosophers who make it
their business to question science, or reason, or truth are routinely charged with the
offense or crime of irrationalism and are accordingly re-categorized – at their Sunday
best – as poets (Nietzsche), mystics (Heidegger and sometimes W ittgenstein), or
romantics (all three). But this same categorization is also the basis for denigrating and
excluding such perspectives. That I think such repudiation is wrong is by now clear, but
my reasons are far from postmodern. Philosophy has long defined itself as the
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discipline of the rational, the science of science, the love of truth. But the philosopher,
as lover of wisdom or truth, was from the first a seeker, a radical questioner, an inquirer
after origins. W here the pursuit of truth is not to be confessional or devotional but much
rather critical – that is: where it is possible not only to pursue the ideal of truth but
always also to ask “Why truth?”– the philosophy of science cannot simply invoke the
value of science as an unquestioned ideal but ought first to raise the question of science,
in Nietzsche’s words, “as problematic, and questionable.” 22 This task has yet to be
accomplished, but Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other nontraditional philosophers have at
least made the project of a critical philosophy of science plausible.23
AGAINST POSTM ODERN SOPHISTICATION IN SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
The reason so many postmodernists believe that science is on their side is because they
are persuaded, like everyone else in Western, which is to say, global society, that
science is inherently liberating: science is conceived as free play – the sphere in which
orthodoxies have no purchase. But this belief comes at the cost of a coopted
conventionality. Any assumption of postmodern sophistication on the part of science
and technology is illusory, yet this does not mean it is not an accidental
misunderstanding. W ith deadly earnest levity and self-declared irony, the vision of
postmodern sophistication promises to overcome the limitations of the modern idea of
progress by means of what is “technically” called “playfulness.” W hat is meant by this
playfulness is modern, techno-jocularity – Feynberg style.
There is and there can be nothing like a postmodern perspective interior to science
itself and this is essentially because the project of science is an ineliminably modern
project. Hence there is no postmodern science as such. The project of science is not the
reflection upon, not the thinking of, or theory of, but and only the consecration or
certification of, knowledge. And science is non-self-reflexive because it is the only
“episteme” in town. As science occupies the place once held by the church in W estern
society, so, whatever our politics and whatever our stand on global warming, pesticides,
gene-altered grains, we all run to science for justification of our position. As the free
thinker once said of the church, we have no choice but to love its poison. 24 W e are all
courtiers of truth, however awkward our rhetoric; we are all defenders of rational
inquiry, no matter our critical suspicions. Hence we are bound to go, in Nietzsche’s
words, “straight into-the old ideal.” 25
The critique of science cannot be conducted by social scientists – neither historians
nor anthropologists, neither sociologists nor rhetoricians for the good and simple reason
that all of these specialist scholars, “social” or not, are scientists themselves. Instead
such critique, in order to be a critique must be the task of a philosophy prepared, for the
sake of truth, reason, and science, to question rather than to assume the values of truth,
rationality, and science. Facing that task, Nietzsche proposed to illuminate the project
of science on the ground of art, and to consider art, in turn, in the light of life. Does this
mean that science, like art, is a human invention? Does this make it, horror of horrors
for Ian Hacking, a social construct? 26 Yes, and of course. But we ought not forget that
social constructs, like art and like science, exceed in both influence and significance the
cultural world that give them birth. The Vichian axiom that we can know only what we
make does not mean, as Nietzsche’ genealogical critique has taken pains to emphasize,
that we already know what we have done. Still, this is not to say, to speak in the
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vernacular of an Alan Sokal, that there is an objective (really real) world apart from our
knowledge of it. The question of the objective reality of the world apart from our
knowledge of it is an absurdity. Not because it is patent that the objectively real world
is given with or without the human knower – the very logic of the claim, of what it
means for the world to be given without one to whom it would be given denies the
possibility of the assertion – but because it makes no sense, to use yet another
Nietzschean metaphor, to wonder about the way the world would appear if we could (as
we cannot) cut our heads off and still take a look. 27 The “really-objective” look of things
is unknowable – not so far, not up until now – but intrinsically unknowable because the
world as it can be known by human, subjective inquiry, however scientific, however
objectively attuned, can only count as an object as such for a knowing subject.
It is not uniquely the role of science to prove the patently objective existence of an
objective world. Medieval theologians could “prove” the existence of angels on the
grounds of their necessity, much as current physicists demand or posit the existence of
neutrinos to enforce modern theories of stellar evolution. The aether once consigned to
the realms of romantic fancy by scientists seems poised to be reinstalled one day as the
framework for the energies of the universe. Physicists and scientists generally have very
simple notions of reality, truth, and objectivity, and (as social and historical studies of
science attest) they are notoriously unreliable witnesses to their own practice. They are
in a word, incompetent philosophers of science. But the reliability of scientists in
accounting for science reflects a quite ordinary self-reflexive limit, and in any case the
value of science is practical. Science is skilled labor and, in that sense, an art. Scientists
know how to do things, but that does not mean that science has to do with thinking. For
calculation is not about reflection; it is about the production of effects, within limits, for
the sake of appearances.28
CONCLUSION
I began with a reference to jesting and the perspective that can aid such jests. Unlike
Alan Sokal’s, I fully intend the literal point of such provocations. Philosophy of the
analytic and reigning kind does in general seek to model itself on the image of science,
and physics now has adopted the pose (for the media, anyway) of wisdom. But why
should physics neglect its own affairs to play the role of purveyor of meytaphysical
truths or indeed to stage elaborate hoaxes? Little of moment has occurred in physics
since 1925 – some would even argue that the great era of scientific achievement is not
still to come and that that is not, as some popular science writers argue, because the
truth has been discovered. And it may have made a difference for his scientific career
that W erner Heisenberg, for example, enjoyed a classically traditional education,
requiring that already as a young man he had read Immanuel Kant’s reflections on the
problem of space and time. M ight Heisenberg’s familiarity with philosophical concepts
(as the very philosophical tradition of thinking hard and unthinkable questions, where
philosophy is neither logic nor science nor art but a kind of love) not have been
essential to his scientific work as well as his later popular essays on these very themes?
It is fashionable to claim that Einstein was not a great expert in mathematics. But, like
Heisenberg, Einstein enjoyed the broad education, including the study of philosophy,
that is altogether missing in the formation of today’s scientists, not only in physics but
increasingly in biology (and this means medical science) as well. The mathematical or
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computer literacy required for the sake of practical proficiency in any given scientific
discipline has come to replace the kind of conceptual literacy once taken for granted in
the formation of an Einstein or a Heisenberg.
I am far from making a plea for courses on Shakespeare for Cosmologists. I argue
for the special value of philosophical study in the education of scientists became that
study is a step in the direction of learning how to think. Heidegger observed that science
does not think; and before him, not only Nietzsche but also Descartes, who was a
mathematician as well as a scientist and philosopher, emphasized the danger of
assuming that thinking was a skill one did not need to learn. 29 Science can learn to think.
W hat a revolution thinking might be for science I do not pretend to say. But there is no
way to thinking without philosophy.
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